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DEFENDANTS FAILURE TO TESTIFY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -COMMENT ON DEFEN-
DANT'S FAILURE To TESTIFY -Davis v. State, 406 So.2d
795 (Miss. 1981)
Malcolm Joe Davis was convicted of rape in the Circuit Court
of Pearl River County, Mississippi. Two confessions were includ-
ed in the evidence the state had obtained against Davis. At a pre-
trial suppression hearing conducted to determine the admissibili-
ty of these confessions, they were admitted over the arguments
of Davis that they were involuntarily given. During the trial-in-
chief, the prosecuting attorney made reference to the time the con-
fessions were given and stated that "all the defendant had to do
at that time was to deny that he committed the offense."' Davis'
counsel promptly objected to the prosecutor's remarks, entered
a motion for a mistrial, and was overruled on both pointg. The
defense counsel, however, failed to preserve the prosecutor's state-
ment for the record. What does appear in the record is an ac-
count of the events as dictated into the record by the trial judge.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court's ac-
tions denied Davis his rights to a fair trial under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.' Davis argued that by allowing the prosecutor
to comment on the defendant's failure to testify, the trial court
denied the accused the rights guaranteed by these amendments.3
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in an eight to one decision,
disagreed and affirmed Davis' conviction. The court based its deci-
sion on the fact that the defense did not preserve the statement
for the record.' In such a situation the court simply assumes that
the trial judge ruled correctly. Siding with the defendant in a
dissenting opinion, Justice Hawkins argued that the trial court's
actions violated not only the defendant's constitutional rights but
his statutory rights as well.'
Background and History
Mississippi statutorily provides that an accused is a compe-
tent witness in any prosecution against him.6 The code further
adds that "the failure of the accused, in any case, to testify shall
1. Davis v. State, 406 So. 2d 795, 801 (Miss. 1981).
2. Id. at 797. Though Davis assigned numerous errors, the scope of this note will be limited
to the allegation of improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 801.
5. Id. at 802 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
6. MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-9 (1972).
1982]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
not, however, operate to his prejudice or be commented on by
counsel" 7 This principle has been followed through the years
dating back to the statute's inception in 1882.' Through seven code
revisions the language of this provision has not changed. Such
persistence on the part of the legislature together with the simple
and precise wording of the statute seems to indicate the drafter's
intention that the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant's
failure to testify. However, despite such indications from the
legislature, the courts have devised exceptions to this general rule.
The Mississippi Supreme Court seemingly settled the ques-
tion concerning a comment on defendants failure to testify nearly
a century ago in Yarbrough v. State.' In Yarbrough, the pro-
secuting attorney included in his argument the statement that "the
defendant has not taken the stand, which is his privilege under
the law, and no inference can be drawn from the fact." 10 At this
point, the trial judge stopped the prosecuting attorney and directed
him not to continue in that direction. The attorney nevertheless
continued, "unfortunately for the defendant, he has not, in this
case, for he has immolated himself on an altar of his own
erection."11 In construing section 1741 of the 1892 code, the
supreme court stated that the statute "forbids, in unmistakable
language, any comment, friendly or unfriendly." " The court em-
phatically stated that the statute "forbids any remark, of any
character, in any words, upon the failure of the accused to
testify."3 The defendant's conviction was consequently reversed.
This position was reiterated in the case of Reddick v. State. 14 The
prosecutor in Reddick had made reference to an alleged admis-
sion by the defendant saying "[a]nd he has not denied it." Upon
objections by defense counsel the prosecutor corrected himself
by saying "[ilt has not been denied."'" Speaking for the majority
in Reddick, Justice Woods wrote that even though a prosecutor
does not intend to refer to the fact that the defendant did not testify,
a comment is nevertheless improper so long as it "could be
reasonably construed to be a comment . . . upon the failure of
7. Id.
8. 1882 Miss. LAWS ch. 78. The provision was provided in the following codes: Miss. CODE
§ 1603 (1880); Miss. CODE § 1741 (1892); Miss. CODE § 1918 (1906); MISS CODE § 1578 (1917);
MIss. CODE § 1530 (1930); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1691 (1942).
9. 70 Miss. 593, 12 So. 551 (1893).
10. Id. at 594, 12 So. at 551.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 72 Miss. 1008, 16 So. 490 (1895).
15. Id. at 1009, 16 So. at 490.
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the accused to testify."1 Justice Woods went on to say that curative
instructions to the jury would be fruitless for they "could
not . . . undo the wrong already done." 7 In 1906 in Smith v.
State"8 the court was again asked to decide the issue. Factually,
Smith presented to the court a homicide at which four people were
present: the defendant, the deceased, and two witnesses, both of
whom testified for the state. After all the witnesses to the homicide
had testified, with the exception of the defendant, the prosecutor
remarked that "no one had denied that he [the defendant] killed
Buchanan."" Thus at the time the statement was made only the
defendant could have issued a denial. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the court maintained that the "impression irresistibly
conveyed" by the prosecutor's comments was "that a failure to
deny should be construed as a silent admission."20 Such an im-
pression, it was argued, is the very thing that the law was intend-
ed to prevent. Smith turns on a literal interpretation of the statute.
Any comment on the defendant's failure to testify is prohibited;
"this is true without regard to the character of the comment, or
the motive or intent with which it is made."21 By 1906, after these
three cases, the question seemed settled. Under no circumstances
would a comment on the defendant's failure to testify be tolerated.
This premise, however, was threatened by the decision in Prince
v. State2 in 1908.
In Prince, during the trial the prosecuting attorney made the
statement that the "confession stands uncontradicted before you
today." In reversing Prince's conviction, the court held that any
reference to the defendant's failure to testify "of any character
whatever . . . constitutes reversible error."" But more important-
ly, Chief Justice Whitfield, author of the opinion, made his feel-
ings on the subject clear. He argued that the legislature should
amend the statute to preclude reversal in every case no matter
how subtle the comment might have been. Justice Whitfield
reasoned that the literal holdings of Yarbrough, Reddick and the
statute would require the court to reverse a murder conviction
"in which the evidence showed overwhelmingly, beyond any
reasonable doubt, a case of cold-blooded assassination, without
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 87 Miss. 627, 40 So. 229 (1906).
19. Id. at 628, 40 So. at 230.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 93 Miss. 263, 46 So. 537 (1908).
23. Id. at 266, 46 So. at 538.
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any defense whatever on the merits."" Further, this would be so,
Whitfield warned, solely because the defendant did not testify and
the state's attorney commented on this fact. Justice Whitfield con-
cluded that since the jury is already aware of the fact that the defen-
dant did not testify, the comment should simply be treated as any
other error. " If the premise that any comment is prohibited was
threatened in Prince, it was physically wounded in Drane v. State6
decided the same year as Prince.
Drane presented to the court another murder conviction. Here,
a man named Latham had overheard a conversation between the
defendant and a man named Burns. After Latham had testified
as to what he heard, the prosecutor made the comment that
"nobody on earth has denied what Lawrence Latham said about
this."" This time, however, the court affirmed the conviction con-
cluding that Burns could have denied Latham's testimony. Indeed,
it is Burns' presence that provides the critical difference between
Prince and Drane. In Prince only the defendant could have denied
the evidence, whereas in Drane not only could the defendant have
denied the evidence but so could have Burns. These early cases
begin to formulate the test by which a comment on the defen-
dant's failure to testify is to be judged. No comment will be allowed
unless the statement could have referred to one other than the
defendant. This principle was upheld in 1946 in Martin v. State."8
In Martin, the prosecutor made reference to the accused and
said that his incriminating actions were "undisputed."' In revers-
ing Martin's conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses,
the Mississippi Supreme Court held that since only the defendant
could have denied his own actions the prosecutor's statements were
improper. The same results were reached in Winchester v. State. 30
The fatal error occurred in Winchester when the county attorney
asked, "what defense has been shown here? There is no denial
that he killed her." The error was compounded by the district at-
torney when he said, "Not a single soul has said she was not shot
as this Darden woman has told you."'" The court found that since
under the circumstances of the case only two people, the defen-
24. Id. at 267, 46 So. at 538.
25. Id.
26. 92 Miss. 180, 45 So. 149 (1908).
27. Id. at 184, 45 So. at 149.
28. 200 Miss. 142, 26 So. 2d 169 (1946).
29. Id. at 156, 26 So. 2d at 171.
30. 163 Miss. 462, 142 So. 454 (1932).
31. Id. at 473, 142 So. at 456.
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dant and the state's witness, could deny the evidence, the remarks
were an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
A second exception to the no comment rule was carved out
in House v. State. 2 Though whether the prosecutor's remark in
House amounted to a comment on the defendant's failure to testify
was questionable, the court conceded for the sake of argument
that it was such a comment. Nevertheless, the defendant's murder
conviction was upheld. The court declared thathe defendant could
not have been prejudiced by the statement since the evidence of
guilt weighed so heavily against him. The court stated that "the
jury could not, under their oaths, have arrived at any verdict other
than one of guilty.""3 Thus the court adopts the second exception
to the general rule that no comment whatsoever may be made upon
the defendant's failure to testify. This exception also seizes upon
Justice Whitfield's comments in Prince v. State."4 With this ex-
ception, no longer would a "cold-blooded assassin" escape punish-
ment merely because the prosecutor made an improper comment
on the defendant's exercise of his right not to testify. These two
exceptions to the rule were first recognized together in the case
of Lambert v. State. 3
In Lambert, the prosecutor made the statement "where is the
testimony that he did not do it . . . There is no denial." ' After
reviewing the cases on point, the court concluded that a comment
on the defendant's failure to testify warranted a reversal unless
"1) there was an eye-witness other than defendant available to the
accused and who was not placed upon the stand by him, or 2)
the guilt of defendant was so manifest that no fair jury could have
returned a verdict other than guilty. " "' Justice Robards, writing
for the majority, held that the prosecutor's statements did not fall
within either of the two exceptions. The defendant's robbery con-
viction was consequently reversed. As Justice Whitfield had in
Prince, Justice Robards in Lambert expressed dismay over the
operation of the controlling statute. He maintained that a pro-
secutor's comments should not force a reversal when they do
nothing more than call to the attention of the jury the fact that
the defendant did not testify. Indeed, that the defendant did-not
testify is a fact that is readily apparent to the jury. 8 Since Lambert,
32. 121 Miss. 436, 83 So. 611 (1920).
33. Id. at 437, 83 So. at 611-12. Citing Wells v. State, 96 Miss. 500, 51 So. 209 (1910).
34. 93 Miss. 263, 267, 46 So. 537, 538 (1908).
35. 199 Miss. 790, 25 So. 2d 477 (1946).
36. Id. at 792, 25 So. 2d at 477.
37. Id. at 797, 25 So. 2d at 479-80.
38. Id. at 799, 25 So. 2d at 480.
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Mississippi cases generally have fallen into one of these two
categories. There has been either a reversal due to an unlawful
comment on the defendant's failure to testify," or one of the two
recognized exceptions has operated resulting in affirmation of the
lower court's decision.4"
However, a third group of cases which do not readily fit into
any of the recognized categories should be considered. These cases
center around a prosecutor's statement that the state's evidence
remains undenied or uncontradicted. Either no reference is made
to the defendant directly or the reference is directed towards the
commission of the crime. For instance, in Johnson v. State' the
state's attorney argued that "the testimony for the state was
uncontradicted." ' On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court did
not agree that this was an indirect comment on the defendant's
failure to testify. The court noticed that the sole evidence pro-
duced in the trial was that of the state. To forbid the prosecutor
to mention this fact under the guise of an improper comment on
the defendant's failure to testify would be "to deny to the state
the privilege of arguing the case at all."43 A similar comment was
made in Baird v. State.4 In Baird, the prosecutor made the remark
that "the testimony for the state shows that in this case a cold-
blooded murder has been done, and it is undisputed." 5 This, too,
was held not to be an improper comment on the defendant's failure
to testify. The categorization of these cases is difficult. Justice
Robards in Lambert is hard pressed to find a slot for Johnson."
The statements made in these cases appear to be improper com-
ments upon the defendant's failure to testify. Who could better
contradict the evidence than the accused himself? However, an
analysis of the statements and the context in which they were made
illustrates that the statements were not improper. In Johnson, the
statement "the testimony for the state was uncontradicted" 47 refers
39. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 351 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1978); Clark v. State, 260 So. 2d
445 (Miss. 1972).
40. See Barnes v. State, 230 Miss. 299, 92 So. 2d 863 (1957) (wherein a prosecutor's com-
ment was held harmless since the statement did not go to the guilt of the defendant and could
have been disputed by persons other than the defendant); Bramlett v. State, 37 So. 2d 305 (Miss.
1948) (in which an improper comment was held harmless since there was no dispute as to who
committed the crime).
41. 109 Miss. 622, 68 So. 917 (1915).
42. Id. at 623, 68 So. at 917.
43. Id. at 623-24, 68 So. at 917.
44. 146 Miss. 547, 112 So. 705 (1927).
45. Id. at 551, 112 So. at 706.
46. 199 Miss. at 797, 25 So. 2d at 479-80.
47. Id. at 796, 25 So. 2d at 479.
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not to any specific matter but to the whole of the state's evidence.
Whereas a statement such as "where is the testimony that he did
not do it" does refer to a specific matter: the crime itself as op-
posed to the evidence in general. Also, the word "uncontradicted"
speaks generally and "does not convey the meaning of a personal
denial" as does the statement "There is no denial.""8 In Baird, the
statement could be classed not as a comment on the defendant's
failure to testify, but as a reference to the fact that a crime has
been committed. The prosecutor's statement in Baird does not draw
attention to the fact that the defendant has failed to testify but on-
ly to the fact that a crime has been committed by someone.
The Griffin Rule
The United States Supreme Court similarly had difficulty with
a strict rule of no comment. As in Mississippi, the Supreme Court
began with a hard fast rule of no comment and subsequently soft-
ened the rule. The issue was first addressed by the Supreme Court
in 1893 in Wilson v. United States. 9 Wilson concerned an inter-
pretation of a federal statute"0 identical to the Mississippi statute.
In holding that it is reversible error for a prosecutor to violate
the act by commenting on the defendant's failure to testify, the
court stated that the act was designed with "due regard . . . to
those who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence
which the law gives to everyone, and not wish to be witnesses.
The court argues that it is difficult for most to take the stand even
though they may be entirely innocent. For timidity, nervousness
and fear that evidence of other crimes may be brought out on cross-
examination tends to "confuse and embarass" the defendant so that
his testimony may operate to his detriment rather than to his ad-
vantage. The court concludes, "It is not everyone, however honest,
who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand."52
Many years later, the court affirmed this position in Griffin v.
California. 3
In Griffin, the prosecutor had taken full advantage of a Califor-
nia consititutional provision"4 which allowed comment on the
48. Id.
49. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
50. Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (1878) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3481
(1948)).
51. 149 U.S. at 66.
52. Id.
53. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
54. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 13.
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defendant's failure to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence
presented. The trial judge had also followed California's constitu-
tion by instructing the jury that although the defendant had a right
not to testify, his failure to deny or explain the evidence could
be taken into consideration." There thus exists a difference bet-
ween Griffin on the one hand and Wilson on the other. Both Wilson
and the Mississippi cases involve an interpretation of statutes,
phrased in negative terms, that comment is expressly forbidden.
Griffin, on the other hand, involves a state constitutional provi-
sion phrased in positive terms, that comment is expressly al-
lowed. Thus whether comment is proper in Griffin necessarily
rests upon federal constitutional grounds. Writing for the court
in Griffin, Justice Douglas began the opinion by noting this dif-
ference. Had this been a federal trial, he says, Wilson and the
present statute,6 would mandate reversal. 7 But this is not a federal
trial and the court stated the issue in Griffin to be "whether, statute
or not, the comment rule, approved by California, violates the
Fifth Amendment." 8 In reaching the conclusion that the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment does indeed forbid
not only "comment by the prosecutor on the accused's silence"
but also "instructions by the court that such silence is evidence
of guilt," 9 the Court adopts a penalty theory. By allowing com-
ment on the defendant's failure to take the stand, Justice Douglas
argues, the Court would impose a penalty on the defendant for
exercising his constitutional privilege. "It cuts down on the
privilege," he says "by making its assertion costly." 60 In reaching
this decision, the court rejected the argument that it is "natural
and irresistable" to infer guilt from the defendant's failure to testify
by saying that "[wihat the jury may infer, given no help from the
court is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes
the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite
another."6
Justice Stewart, however, did not accept this position. In a
dissent, Stewart criticized the majority's penalty theory and opted
for a compulsion theory. The fifth amendment states that no per-
son "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
55. 380 U.S. at 610.
56. 18 U.S.C. §3481 (1948).
57. 380 U.S. at 612.
58. Id. at 613.
59. Id. at 615.
60. Id. at 614.
61. Id.
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.himself.""2 Therefore, Stewart reasoned that the question to be
decided is "whether the [defendant] has been 'compelled ...to
be a witness against himself.' "63 Stewart, of course, would answer
this question in the negative. If there was compulsion in Griffin's
case, he argued, it was of a "dramatically different and less
palpable nature than that involved in the procedures which
historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment."64 Stewart would
sustain California's constitutional provision which allowed com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify.
Griffin concludes that any comment upon the defendant's
failure to testify is prohibited. However, the Supreme Court
modified this holding in Chapman v. California."' The question
in Chapman was not whether the prosecutor's comments amounted
to a violation of the Griffin rule since they obviously did. Rather,
the question was under what circumstances would a violation of
the Griffin rule constitute reversible error. In answer, the court
declared that only those statements that are "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" will be tolerated.66 It should be noted that some
states have gone beyond this mandate and have applied a much
harsher rule holding that any comment on the defendant's failure
to testify is error.6' This is the context in which Davis v. State
was decided.
Analysis
Since the defense counsel did not preserve the prosecutor's
closing argument for the record by a bill of exceptions, the ma-
jority in Davis assumed that the lower court's ruling in the matter
was correct. "Without the precise words of the argument," the
court said, "or the context in which it was made, we have dif-
ficulty in determining a reasonable conclusion of the statement
or in determining possible prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict."'
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3. The fifth amendment was applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
63. 380 U.S. at 620.
64. Id. See also M. Berger, TAKING THE FIFTH 77 (1980). Though comment on the defen-
dant's failure to testify surely represents a pressure to testify, it is not of the "magnitude of the
techniques out of which the privilege evolved." Id.
65. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
66. Id. at 24.
67. Some courts have gone farther than the U.S. Constitution mandates and hold that any
comment is a violation of the Griffin rule. The rationale for such a requirement is that such a
comment is so prejudicial by its very nature as to require automatic reversal. See State v. Wright,
251 La. 511, 205 So. 2d 381 (1968); State v. Smith, 101 Ariz. 407,420 P.2d 278 (1966); Sanders
v. State, 216 Tenn. 425, 392 S.W.2d 916 (1965).
68. 406 So. 2d at 801.
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The majority reaches this conclusion despite the fact that the trial
judge entered into the record an account of the events that took
place.
In the dissent, Justice Hawkins was of the opinion that the
record was adequate to justify a reversal. Relying on Lambert and
Reddick, Hawkins reiterated that "no comment whatsoever shall
be made upon the defendant's failure to testify .... "" Ac-
cording to Justice Hawkins, the statement made by the prosecutor
amounted to a violation of the defendant's statutory and constitu-
tional rights. "For twelve jurors under those cir-
cumstances . . . not [to] instantly be alerted by this comment [that]
the defendant could have denied his guilt as a witness from the
witness chair, each would first require a lobotomy."" Finally,
Justice Hawkins said that he thought it strange that the state would
make such a comment with the evidence of guilt so strong.71
Where then does Davis fit in the categories provided in
Lambert? What effect should Chapman have on Davis? What is
the status of the no comment rule? These questions have no definite
answer. Although Davis was decided on the fact that the defense
counsel failed to preserve an adequate record, the decision is never-
theless sound. Lambert provided two exceptions to the no com-
ment rule. One of those exceptions provided such an error should
be held harmless when "the guilt of the defendant was so manifest
that no fair jury could have returned a verdict other than guilty."72
This is the situation in Davis. Even Justice Hawkins in his dis-
sent thought it strange that the state made the comment "with the
proof of the guilt of the defendant so strong."" Even if an ade-
quate record had been made, the court would have been justified
in reaching the same conclusion under Lambert. It is interesting
that though the dissent cited Lambert, it failed to follow the line
of cases that provides one of the exceptions to the no comment
rule. Perhaps though the dissent was not incorrect in its assump-
tion that Davis' conviction should have been overturned due to
an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify. That is,
perhaps Davis has rights in addition to those passed upon by
Lambert and by those cases that follow. Lambert and the line of
cases that follow provide an interpretation of the defendant's
statutory rights. What of the defendant's fifth amendment rights?
69. Id. at 802 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 199 Miss. 790, 799, 25 So. 2d 477, 480.
73. 406 So. 2d at 803, (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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Chapman v. California provides this answer since it was held
therein that a "Griffin"violation was permissible only if the state-
ment was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ' Thus the ques-
tion becomes, "was the prosecutor's comment in Davis harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt?" The answer to this question depends
much more on the exact words of the prosecutor than does a
Lambert approach. In this respect, the majority was clearly cor-
rect when it stated that it traditionally has declined to "rule in mat-
ters not preserved in the record in sufficient detail for purposes
of appeal. '
Whatever the result of this conjecture might be, one thing
is clear. Comment on the defendant's failure to testify is an elusive
issue. Despite a seemingly clear and unequivical code provision,
the cases have carved out exceptions as to when a comment will
be allowed and when it will not. However, one point does seem
clear. A defendant cannot sit silently and claim that the prohibi-
tion against comment on his failure to testify protects him from
any evidence legitimately presented. As Wharton has pointed out,
"The prohibition against adverse comment and inference does not
protect the defendant from the probative force of the evidence
against him. If a defendant does not attempt to rebut incriminating
facts he cannot, merely by remaining silent, escape the natural
and reasonable inferences deducible from such facts."' However,
prosecutors who might abuse the liberties provided by Tutle v.
State77 and Wharton are warned in Harwell v. State8 that "counsel
should be given wide discretion to matters in evidence in their
argument, but only as to 'those matters in evidence.' , It is this
very point that the U.S. Supreme Court makes in Griffin when
it states that "what the jury may infer given no help of the court
is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnized the
silence of the accused against him is quite another.""
Robert Lewis Spell
74. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966).
75. 406 So. 2d at 801.
76. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 146 at 277 (1955). Accord Tuttle v. State, 252
Miss. 733, 174 So. 2d 345 (1965) wherein the court stated, "While a person may remain silent
where circumstances would require a prompt explanation consistent with innocence, inference
may be drawn from such silences in favor of guilt." Id. at 739, 174 So. 2d at 347.
77. 252 Miss. 733, 174 So. 2d 345 (1965).
78. 129 Miss. 858, 93 So. 366 (1922).
79. Id. at 864, 93 So. at 368.
80. 380 U.S. 609, 614.
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